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ABSTRACT Vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) provides a unique platform for vehicles to intelligently
exchange critical information, such as collision avoidance messages. It is, therefore, paramount that this
information remains reliable and authentic, i.e., originated from a legitimate and trusted vehicle. Trust
establishment among vehicles can ensure security of a VANET by identifying dishonest vehicles and
revoking messages with malicious content. For this purpose, several trust models (TMs) have been proposed
but, currently, there is no effective way to compare how they would behave in practice under adversary
conditions. To this end, we propose a novel trust evaluation and management (TEAM) framework, which
serves as a unique paradigm for the design, management, and evaluation of TMs in various contexts and in
presence of malicious vehicles. Our framework incorporates an asset-based threat model and ISO-based risk
assessment for the identification of attacks against critical risks. The TEAM has been built using VEINS,
an open source simulation environment which incorporates SUMO traffic simulator and OMNET++
discrete event simulator. The framework created has been tested with the implementation of three types
of TMs (data oriented, entity oriented, and hybrid) under four different contexts of VANET based on the
mobility of both honest and malicious vehicles. Results indicate that the TEAM is effective to simulate a
wide range of TMs, where the efficiency is evaluated against different quality of service and security-related
criteria. Such framework may be instrumental for planning smart cities and for car manufacturers.
INDEX TERMS Vehicular networks, trust management, smart cities, security, intelligent transportation
systems, VEINS, SUMO, OMNET++, simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a preeminent interest has been observed in the
technologies to improve transportation around the world.
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET) is the state-of-the-art
technology in the domain of transportation where vehicles
communicate with each other and static Roadside Units
(RSUs) via vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) communication to offer various
applications. It includes both safety (e.g., traffic safety
and efficiency) and non-safety (e.g., infotainment) applica-
tions [1]–[5]. VANET performs a key role in the emerging
smart cities and Internet-of-Things (IoT) with the aim to
improve overall transportation [6], [7]. Figure 1 illustrates
the integration of VANET in smart cities where traffic safety
is achieved by connecting vehicles to each other by virtue of
V2V or V2I communication.
Since, applications offered to connected vehicles involve
very critical information (such as steep-curve, or accident
warning), a secure, attack-free and trusted network is imper-
ative for the propagation of reliable, accurate and authentic
information. In case of VANET, ensuring such network is
extremely difficult due to its large-scale and open nature,
making it susceptible to diverse range of attacks including
man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, jamming and eavesdrop-
ping attacks [8]–[11].
Recently, various solutions have been proposed to achieve
security in VANET. Most of these solutions rely on tradi-
tional cryptography where vehicles utilize certificates and
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to ensure security in the
network. However, cryptography-based solutions reduce net-
work efficiency due to following reasons. (1) Firstly, VANET
includes both low and highly mobile vehicles which are
dispersed randomly throughout the network, (2) Secondly,
presence of an infrastructure cannot be ensured permanently,
e.g., in rural areas, and (3) lastly, cryptographic solutions
can be compromised by insider attacks in VANET, which
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FIGURE 1. Illustration of VANET in smart cities.
results in the propagation of untrusted messages across the
network [12].
In order to address these shortcomings, trust has been
proposed as a relevant technique to achieve network secu-
rity. Trust is defined as the confidence of one node on the
other for performing a specific action or set of actions [13].
In VANET, it is established between two vehicles based on
themessages exchanged regarding an event. Once, message is
received, the evaluator node calculates trust based on numer-
ous factors, including vehicles past interactions, vehicles
reputation in the network and neighbors’ recommendations
about particular vehicle. However, trust between neighboring
vehicles is created for a very limited duration of time due to
highly mobile and randomly distributed vehicles [14], [15].
Therefore, establishing, calculating, and evaluating trust on
received messages based on diverse factors in such short
period of time is extremely challenging.
Trust, as a technique to achieve security in VANET, is in its
early stage of development. Trust models (TMs) are embed-
ded within vehicles to evaluate trustworthiness, accuracy and
authenticity of received messages. TMs ensure the propa-
gation of trusted information in the network by revoking
both dishonest nodes (vehicle) and messages having mali-
cious content. In VANET, TMs are classified into three dis-
tinct classes, i.e., entity-oriented, data-oriented and hybrid
TMs [16]–[19]. Entity-oriented trust models (EOTM) aims
to eliminate dishonest vehicles by evaluating trustworthiness
on the node. Data-oriented trust models (DOTM) evaluates
trust on the received messages (data) while hybrid trust
models (HTM) relies on both vehicle and data for trust
establishment.
In VANET, various TMs are developed to ensure secu-
rity either by eliminating dishonest vehicles or tempered
messages [20]–[23]. However, it is currently complicated to
compare and evaluate the efficiency of these TMs due to
absence of a unified trust evaluation framework. Moreover,
high mobility and random distribution of vehicles across the
network result in various contexts in VANET. Therefore,
it becomes significantly important to take those contexts
into account for trust management. For instance, in an urban
location, extensive amount of messages (trusted & untrusted)
are present due to low mobility of vehicles and abundant
number of RSUs. On the other hand, rural areas cannot ensure
the permanent presence of RSU.Moreover, high mobility and
low number of vehicles in such locations produce minimum
amount of messages. TMs which depends on high number
of RSUs and vehicles for trust management will show poor
results for a scenario with minimum number of vehicles. As a
result, both scenarios demand separate techniques to evalu-
ate trustworthiness on transmitting node and their messages.
VANET can succeed only if secure and trusted messages are
ensured in every context.
In this paper, we addressed this problem by propos-
ing a novel trust evaluation and management framework
called TEAM, which have the ability to evaluate TMs
in numerous contexts of VANET. In TEAM framework,
we model and evaluate the efficiency of different TMs based
on main objects of VANET. i.e., data and node. Moreover,
major attacks are also identified based on asset-based threat
model and ISO-based risk assessment as a preliminary study.
Once, the list of attacks related to TM is available, the
TMs are evaluated under these attack models in different
contexts of VANET. This can determine the impact of mali-
cious attacks on TMs and their performance in various con-
texts. In order to do so, we conducted an extensive set of
experiments to evaluate the performance of TMs from each
category (EOTM, DOTM&HTM) using TEAM. Simulation
results depict that our framework can accurately evaluate the
efficiencies of TMs in various context of VANET.
In summary, the significant contributions of this paper are
as follows:
• First, we proposed a novel trust evaluation framework in
this paper, which has the ability to evaluate a wide range
of TMs (EOTM, DOTM and HTM).
• Second, we introduced the concept of context for the
evaluation of TM in VANET. Particularly, we identified
four contexts based on the mobility of vehicles and
attackers in the network.
• Third, we performed an asset-based threat modeling for
the identification of attacks by directlymapping vulnera-
bilities with threats in VANET. Then, risk assessment is
performed to identify attacks with higher severity. The
attacks with higher severity levels are implemented in
our framework.
• Fourth, we considered several realistic evaluation cri-
teria for the TMs, focusing entirely on the Quality of
Service (QoS) and security of the network, and
• Finally, we performed an extensive set of experiments
for the evaluation of TMs in four contexts and in pres-
ence of malicious nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides relevant information about TMs in VANET. Then,
proposed trust evaluation framework is explained in detail
in section III. Section IV provides the details of simulation
environment, while section V is dedicated to the simulation
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results and discussion of the performance of TEAM frame-
work. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we presented various categories of trust mod-
els (TMs) in VANET. Moreover, we also explored relevant
research related to trust frameworks.
A. TRUST MODELS IN VANET
In VANET, main objective of the TM is to ensure secure
and trusted data dissemination by identifying dishonest vehi-
cles and revoking compromised messages from the network.
Recently, various TMs have been proposed in VANET, which
can be classified broadly into three categories: (1) data-
oriented TM (DOTM), (2) entity-oriented TM (EOTM), and
(3) hybrid TM (HTM).
1) DATA-ORIENTED TRUST MODELS
In these TMs, data plays a central role where trustworthi-
ness in the accuracy and authenticity of received message is
computed by the node. These TMs highly depend on their
previous interactions with the peers, and the opinions shared
from the vehicles in its vicinity.
One of the earlier work in this direction is the TM proposed
by Raya et al., where evidence on the received events is
accumulated based onBayesian inference (BI) andDempster-
Shafer Theory (DST) [24]. In this TM, evaluator node (EV )
first receive reports from vehicles in the neighborhood, and
then assign weights to every received report based on location
and time closeness to the event. At the EV , these reports along
with the assigned weights are then passed to a decision logic
module where trust is calculated using BI and DST. The main
shortcoming of this TM is the fact that trust is calculated every
time a data is received, thus making it inefficient for highly
dynamic and sparse environment.
Gurung et al. proposed a complex distributed DOTM
where trustworthiness on event data is evaluated in real
time by vehicles themselves, without any dependence on
RSU [25]. This TM calculates trust in two phases, i.e., mes-
sages received from a large number of neighbors is firstly
classified into two sub-groups using a clustering technique.
First sub-group contains data having similar content, while
the second sub-group include messages with conflicting con-
tent. Once messages are classified into respective sub-groups,
the next phase evaluates the trustworthiness of the messages
based on three factors, i.e., information similarity, infor-
mation conflict and received routing path similarity. This
TM is very complex as it involves real time validation of the
received messages, which may not be feasible in high mobil-
ity and sparse scenario. Moreover, discussion on how this
TM would behave in the presence of attack is not addressed.
Shaikh and Alzahrani filled this gap by proposing an
intrusion-aware TM with the potential to efficiently identify
and detect bogus messages in the network such as mes-
sages with fake location [26]. Trust by EV is calculated
in three phases. First, a confidence value on every data is
calculated based on four factors: (1) location closeness,
(2) time closeness, (3) location verification, and (4) time ver-
ification. Then, trust is calculated for every message based on
the confidence value, and lastly, a fuzzy logic is employed on
the message where a decision module either accepts or rejects
the data. A message is accepted only if its trustworthiness
value achieves a certain threshold level. Although this TM is
very light and efficient for infotainment applications, it is not
applicable for safety applications due to the delay introduced
in the calculation of trust values.
2) ENTITY-ORIENTED TRUST MODELS
Unlike DOTMs, these TMs adopt an approach to eliminate
malicious entities from the network by evaluating trustwor-
thiness on the vehicle. These TMs rely heavily on neighbors
and message originators for trust management, where the
neighbors endorse a reputation and recommendation about
message sender to EV .
Several studies have been proposed in the literature which
focus entirely on EOTM. For instance, Khan et al. pro-
posed a cluster-oriented approach where the elected cluster
head (CH ) in the network is responsible for the calculation
and evaluation of trust in the network [27]. CH employs
a watchdog mechanism in its neighborhood where legiti-
mate vehicles provide their recommendation to CH about
the presence of misbehaving vehicle in its vicinity. Once,
suchmalicious vehicles are identified,CH informs the trusted
authority (TA) about these vehicles which are then removed
from the network of trusted vehicles. However, major draw-
back of this approach is high overhead caused due to the
report, thus reducing network efficiency. Moreover, the com-
munication details among vehicles, CH , and TA is missing in
this study.
A similar TM is presented by Jesudoss et al. where trust is
calculated by electing a CH in the network [28]. The CH is
responsible to disseminate trusted information in the network.
All the participating nodes follow a truth-telling approach to
gain reputation in the network. The information is trusted
only by CH if participating node gains higher weights in
CH election and by continuously monitoring its neighbor-
ing nodes and identifying malicious information. However,
this solution will fail in a highly mobile and rural location
whereCH might not have enough neighbors and the presence
of the malicious vehicles may result in a biased selection
of CH .
Unlike cluster-based approaches in EOTM,
Haddadou et al. adapted a different technique based on
economic incentive model to exclude malicious nodes from
the network [29]. In this model, all nodes in the neighborhood
are assigned with a specific credit value in a distributed
manner. The increase or decrease in the credit depends on
node behavior in the network. In case of an attack, the credit
is decreased. When the node has no credit left, it is assumed
to be malicious and is excluded from the network. The main
limitation of this TM is its inability to differentiate between
direct or indirect trust.
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Minhas et al., on the other hand presented a TM where
trust is calculated and aggregated based on 4 sources,
i.e., (1) sender node’s experience, (2) priority, (3) role and
(4) majority opinion [30]. When a message is received,
EV identifies and prioritizes vehicles (VP) in its vicinity based
on their reputation and experience, thus incorporating role
and experience-based trust. TheEV then broadcast requests to
VP about the event authenticity, and waits for their response.
Based on time and location closeness,VP reply back to theEV
with their opinions. Once messages from all VP are received,
EV applies a majority rule to identify the trustworthiness
of the vehicle. If the majority of the vehicles agree about
the event, EV accepts the messages, otherwise it follows the
advice of vehicle with the highest role and experience in
the network. Main limitation of this TM is its reliance on
PKI cryptography for the calculation of role-based trust
where the presence of a central authority is required for the
verification of those certificates.
Another EOTM based on trust and reputation is presented
in [31], where a similarity mining approach is adapted to
calculate trust in the network. Whenever a message propa-
gates in the network, EV identify similarity between received
messages which is calculated based on euclidean distance
and reputation weights of the participating vehicles. How-
ever, the main shortcoming of this TM is its dependence on
euclidean distance between the two vehicles as this does not
provide a global information on similarity of the messages.
3) HYBRID TRUST MODELS
Hybrid trust models (HTM) evaluate trust based on the trust-
worthiness of vehicles and the data they exchange. In other
words, these TMs evaluate trust of data by utilizing trust
of vehicles, assuming a trade-off between data authenticity
and sender’s reputation. Therefore, vehicles’ reputation and
neighborhood opinions about a particular vehicle play a vital
role in evaluating trust. These TMs involve a high level of
complexity, as a significant number of control messages have
to be processed in a very short span of time.
The following hybrid trust models can be found in the liter-
ature. Sedjelmaci and Senouci proposed a TM to evaluate the
trustworthiness of a message in presence of various attacks
including sybil and packet duplication attacks [32]. This
TM adopts a two level approach for trust management. First
level identifies CH which evaluates the message trustworthi-
ness in a fully distributed manner. The second level relies
on an adjacent Road Side Unit (RSU) to calculate trust in
a global manner. Therefore, it assumes that stable clusters
are always present in the surroundings of RSU which is the
main limitation of this TM. Moreover, the formation of a
cluster around a RSU, and the selection of CH are time-
intensive processes which increase the overall complexity of
the network.
In order to identify malicious nodes in the network,
Dhurandher et al. adapted an event-oriented approach to
achieve security inVANET by employing reputation and vari-
ous plausibility checks to disseminate safety relatedmessages
in the network [33]. This approach integrates a reputation-
based trust management to identify and isolate malicious
nodes from the network. The EV performs following four
steps for trust management and eviction of the malicious
nodes from the network: (1) neighbor discovery, (2) data
dispatching once neighbors are discovered, (3) trust decision
on the event message received, and (4) continuous monitor-
ing of the neighborhood. However, this approach has some
limitations: First, the detection range as proposed by the
authors in trust decision is very short, i.e., 50m. Secondly,
detection relies heavily on the vehicle’s sensors. If the sensors
malfunction for some reason, then this approach may clas-
sify compromised messages as legitimate which result in the
propagation of false information in the network.
Abdelaziz et al. [34] proposed a light-weight TM to effi-
ciently relay messages towards their destination by utilizing
advantages of the DSRC communication protocol. In this
TM, messages received via communication module are clas-
sified into four classes, where safety messages are given
higher priority. Moreover, its intrusion detection module uti-
lizes anomaly-based detection algorithms to keep statistical
information of neighboring nodes, thus, resulting in the abil-
ity to detect DoS attacks. The main issue with this approach is
its assumption that malicious nodes will behave consistently
throughout their journey, which is invalid in VANET.
To sum up this section, we see that various TMs are
designed to ensure trust management between vehicles
in VANET. However, current solutions have various issues
resulting from inability to cope with attacks, performance and
complexity overheads. Moreover, according to our literature,
there is no TMs for context-enabled VANET based on mobil-
ity of vehicles and adversaries.
B. EVALUATION FRAMEWORKS FOR TRUST
MANAGEMENT
In the previous section, we identified various available
TMs in VANET. These TMs establish trust via different
mechanisms which range from trusting the vehicle to trust-
ing its data. However, very little work has been done for
the evaluation of these TMs. In this section, we focus on
such frameworks which provide some sort of evaluation
of TMs.
Chen et al. proposed a trust management framework where
CH is responsible to establish trust on vehicles based on
neighbors’ opinion aggregation mechanism in a dynamic
environment [35]. In this framework, messages are dissem-
inated only by CH after verification of its authenticity. Every
member of the cluster shares its opinion withCH , where trust
on the aggregated message is calculated based on its validity
and correctness. CH then applies majority rule, where mes-
sages are accepted only if majority of the members agree with
the authenticity of the event. This trusted message is then
broadcast by CH which propagates throughout the network.
The main drawbacks of this frameworks are: (1) This solution
fails in a highly mobile and rural scenario due to low avail-
ability of the cluster members. (2) This framework can only
4 VOLUME 6, 2018
F. Ahmad et al.: TEAM Framework in Context-Enabled VANETs
evaluate the EOTMs, and (3) lastly, the behavior of attackers
on the TM is missing from the paper.
In order to address this issue, Oluoch proposed a theo-
retical framework incorporating RSU for trust evaluation in
VANET [36]. In this framework, a threat model is designed
at first place which consists of means of access of attack-
ers in the network (either V2V communication, or updates
from RSU), type of attacks launched by attackers (e.g., Sybil
and Betrayal attacks) and the action (such as active or passive)
of the attacker in the network. In the next step, threat model
is integrated with trust establishment module, where trust
is calculated by two methods, i.e., global trust establish-
ment and local trust establishment. Global trust establish-
ment is accomplished via RSU, where vehicles in its vicinity
share their opinions about the event with available RSU.
RSU performs majority rule to authorize trusted information
in the network. Local trust establishment between vehicles
is also computed in the absence of RSU, where information
received at EV is analyzed for its authenticity. In such case,
a dynamic threshold is set for trust at the EV . Message is
dropped if it falls below certain threshold, and it is accepted
only if it surpasses the threshold value. This framework has
several drawbacks. First, the authors only proposed a theoret-
ical framework for trust establishment with no mathematical
foundations. Secondly, very basic threat model is considered
in the framework, and the information about threats and
vulnerabilities are missing in the proposed framework. Third,
this is very generic framework and it doesn’t provide any
information about the evaluation of different trust models.
From our literature review, we realized that currently avail-
able frameworks have various limitations for trust evalua-
tion. Therefore, we fill this gap by proposing a novel trust
evaluation framework, which has the capability to evalu-
ate different TMs (EOTM, DOTM and HTM). Moreover,
our framework integrates an asset-based threat model where
attacks are mapped directly from threats and vulnerabilities
in assets. Further, attacks with serious impact on the network
are identified and prioritized via ISO-based risk-assessment.
Moreover, our framework provides a context establishment
module where we identified four scenarios based on node’s
mobility. Once, attacks with high risks and contexts are
identified, TMs are then evaluated against these attacks in
different contexts using realistic trust evaluation criteria in the
trust evaluation platform.
III. PROPOSED TRUST EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we provide details of our proposed trust evalu-
ation and management (TEAM) framework. Figure 2 depicts
high level idea of our proposed framework. It can be seen that
framework is composed of five distinct modules.
1) Module 1: Threat model
2) Module 2: Risk assessment
3) Module 3: Identification and categorization of TMs
4) Module 4: Context establishment
5) Module 5: Trust evaluation platform
FIGURE 2. Proposed Trust Evaluation Framework.
The first two modules (threat model and risk assessment)
are designed to identify various attacks in VANET. Once,
attacks with critical risks are identified, then the efficiency
of TMs are evaluated in various contexts and in the presence
of attacks.
A. MODULE 1: THREAT MODEL
The first and foremost module of our framework is threat
model, where we adopted a systematic approach for attack
identification. In this work, we identified vulnerabilities and
threats in assets of VANET which are exploited by adver-
saries to launch several attacks. The major steps of the threat
model are:
1) Identification and classification of assets based on their
role, mobility and impact in VANET.
a) Information: carrying sensitive messages across
different assets.
b) Vehicular System: contains vehicular user, vehi-
cles and communication network.
c) Infrastructure: includes static entities of the net-
work, such as RSU and CA.
2) Identification of vulnerabilities in assets of
VANET.
a) V1: Insecure algorithms for exchanging user cre-
dentials.
b) V2: Software flaws such as buffer over flow,
key management failure, insecure cryptographic
algorithms.
c) V3: Non-availability of wireless communication
channel during message transfer.
d) V4: Hardware malfunction and error.
3) Identification of threats in VANET, such as
a) T1: Message transmission with weak encryption
tools.
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b) T2: Exposing sensitive information such as
confidential communication between law enforce-
ment vehicles.
c) T3:Message interception by adversaries.
d) T4: Hardware damage due to natural disasters.
4) Identification of attacks in VANET. For instance,
a) A1: Social engineering attack dealing with moral
ethics of VANET users.
b) A2: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks to
intercept and modify messages.
c) A3: Replay attacks by injecting obsolete
messages in the network.
d) A4: Jamming attacks by launching denial of
service attacks.
e) A5: Bogus information addition attacks by intro-
ducing false information in the networks
The attack mapping from threats and vulnerabilities
is depicted in Table 1. For instance, Social Engineering
Attack (A1) occurs due to weak passwords and lack of users
education and awareness (T1) which results in the exploita-
tion of user credentials (V1). Similarly, the attacker can
expose the sensitive information (T2) such as road accident
warning by exploiting wireless communication interface of
vehicle and insecure algorithms (V1) used for message trans-
fer by adding bogus information to the message (A5). The
rest of the vulnerability-threat-attack (VTA) mapping can be
done in the same way. The details of threat model is given in
our previous work [37].
TABLE 1. Vulnerability-threat-attack mapping.
B. MODULE 2: RISK ASSESSMENT
Once, attacks in various components of VANET are iden-
tified, the next phase involves risk assessment to identify
risks caused by attacks in VANET. Risk is directly related to
the vulnerability identified in assets which are exploited by
threats in form of attacks, causing damage to the whole net-
work. AsVANET is an emerging technologywith lacking sta-
tistical attack history, a quantitative based approach can not be
utilized for risk assessment. Therefore, we performed a qual-
itative based risk assessment according to ISO 27005 [38].
Risk is a measurable quantity which depends on ‘‘likelihood
of attack occurrence’’, and ‘‘impact of an attack on network
assets’’. Likelihood and impact can be mapped into three
categories. The resulting risk can be given as:
Risk = function (Likelihood , Impact) (1)
Corresponding risk is also categorized into three classes,
i.e.,Minor, Major and Critical. Risks identified as major and
critical need urgent attention from the user. Table 2 shows
TABLE 2. Risk analysis: scale.
the corresponding risk levels based on the likelihood and the
impact values.
Table 3 performs the risk assessment for attacks identified
in module 1. It can be seen that MITM and DoS attacks have
high risk values in VANET. This is due to the fact that both
jamming and modifying the sensitive message can result in
disaster in the network. The detail risk assessment can be
found in our previous work [39].
TABLE 3. Risk assessment for attacks in VANET.
Module 1 (threat model) and module 2 (risk assessment)
represents the preliminary study of the framework and is
responsible for the identification of the attacker models
in VANET. Let A = {A1,A2,A3, .....,AN } are such attacks
with critical and major risks in VANET. This list of attacks is
provided to the framework as an input where the efficiency of
the TMs has to be evaluated in presence of malicious nodes.
C. MODULE 3: IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORIZATION
OF TMS
This module has two major responsibilities: (1) Firstly,
it identifies the desired TM and, (2) secondly, it categorize
TMs into their respective class, i.e., DOTM, EOTM, and
HTM. Let T = {T1,T2,T3, .....,TN } are ‘N ’ TMs in VANET.
In order to identify respective TM, these TMs are catego-
rized into three classes according to their trust evaluation
mechanism. In order to illustrate the framework, we have
implemented one TM from each category. The details of these
TMs are as follows:
1) DOTM
As mentioned earlier, these TMs rely on data for trust estab-
lishment. In this paper, we implemented a data-oriented
TM proposed by Kerrache et al., where, trustworthiness on
the data is calculated [40]. In this model, trust is established
among vehicles based on two methods: direct trust and indi-
rect trust. Direct trust is calculated directly among the vehi-
cles where vehicles evaluate each other based on the quality
of the messages they provide. On the other hand, indirect trust
establishment is calculated based on the broadcast/drop ratio
from the sender. Let Va is the vehicle which received message
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from Vb, the trust is computed as follows:
Trust(a, b) =
√
Trust(a, b)×√Trustind × Trustdir (2)
Trustdir depends on the received message quality where it
is updated with a factor of α if the message quality is above
certain trust threshold. Trustdir is decreased with factor β if
message quality falls below threshold value. Trustind , on the
other hand, and is calculated as:
Trustind (a, b) = B(a, b)B(a, b)+ D(a, b) (3)
where, B(a, b) and D(a, b) are the number of broadcast and
drop packets by the vehicle.
Whenever a message is received by Va, it computes
trust on the received information based on two values, i.e.,
(1) Quality of Information (infoQ), and (2) Belief
Degree (BD). InfoQ depends on the quality of the message
received, where, infoQ ∈ (0, 1). This factors takes into
account the distance between the nodes and reporting time.
If reporting nodes are away from the event location and the
reporting time is old, then it assigns the lowest infoQ value,
while messages with closest reporting location and time are
assigned with highest values [41]. On the other hand, based
on BD, the report is either classified as true or false. BD is
computed as follows:
BD(a, b) =
√
Trust(a, b)×√BD(a, b)× infoQ (4)
2) EOTM
For the demonstration of our framework, we implemented
an entity-oriented TM proposed by Minhas et al. [30].
This model incorporates a multifaceted approach for trust
modeling where trust on the entity is established based on
experience, priority, role and majority opinion based trust.
When EV received a message from other vehicles, it iden-
tifies vehicles with highest role and highest experience in the
network. Messages received from these vehicles are assigned
with higher weights in the network. If EV receive messages
from other vehicles in its vicinity, then it generates a report
based on time closeness and location closeness. Based on
these reports, EV performs a majority opinion for its trust
calculation. If majority of the vehicles agree on the message
validity, then the message is accepted, otherwise, EV follows
the advise of vehicles with highest roles.
Let TV2V denote the vehicle-to-vehicle trust of vehicle i,
then
TV2V =
{
Trole(i) if vehicle has a role
Texp(i) else
(5)
Role based trust (RBT) is significantly important in this
TM, as these represent highly trusted vehicles which are
approved from higher authorities. Thus, messages transmitted
from these vehicles are mostly trusted. These vehicles include
(1) law-enforcement authorities such as police vehicles,
(2) public transport such as buses and taxis, and (3) profes-
sional vehicles with higher experience of driving.
For vehicles with no roles, experience based trust (EBT)
is calculated. EBT integrates a forgetting factor (λ), which
ensures that old interactions with vehicles gets less weight
as the behavior of vehicles may change over time. If trusted
message is shared from the vehicle, then the overall trust of
the vehicle is increased by:
Texp(i) =
{
(λ)t (1− α)Texp(i) + α if Texp(i) ≥ TThr
(λ)−t (1− α)Texp(i) + α if Texp(i) < TThr (6)
In case of tempered and compromised messages by the
attackers, EV decreases trust of the sender by:
Texp(i) =
{
(λ)t (1− β)Texp(i) + β if Texp(i) ≥ TThr
(λ)−t (1− β)Texp(i) + β if Texp(i) < TThr (7)
In equations 6 & 7, α is the honesty reward for providing
correct information and the value is (0 < α < 1), while,
β is the dishonesty reward for the malicious information.
Value of β is in range (0 < β < 1). Moreover, λ ∈ (0, 1).
In above equations, t is the time closeness factor. Let tevent is
the time of occurrence of event, tcurrent represents the current
time, tmax is the maximum forgetting time of EBT, time
closeness factor (t) is modeled as follows:
t =

tcurrent − tevent
tmax
if (tcurrent − tevent ) < tmax
1 if else
(8)
Once, trust and distrust on the received message is calcu-
lated, then majority opinion is performed by EV to decide the
trustworthiness of the message. If majority of vehicles agree
to the event occurrence, then EV accepts the information,
otherwise, it follows advise from the vehicles with the highest
roles in the network.
3) HTM
As stated earlier, these TMs rely on both node and data for the
evaluation of trust. In this paper, we implemented an event-
oriented HTM known as VSRP (Vehicular Security through
Reputation and Plausibility checks) [33]. VSRP integrates a
reputation-based trust model to quickly identify and isolate
adversaries from the network. In this TM, every node is
equipped with two tables: (1) neighboring table and (2) trust
table.Whenever,EV encountered any neighbor, it stores its ID
and reputation in the neighboring table and its trust value in
the corresponding trust table.
EV performs following four steps for trustmanagement and
eviction of the malicious nodes from the network:
1) Neighbor discovery: This phase identifies neighbors
by broadcasting a neighbourreq packets. Neighbors in the
vicinity respond back to this message via neighbourrep.
Once, neighbor is identified, then initial check is performed
on the message from that node by checking the trust table.
If entry for the specific node is present with trust value other
than 0, then message is accepted, otherwise, message is dis-
carded from such node.
2) Data dispatching: In this phase, data is dispatched to
the identified neighbors.
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3) Trust decision: This step calculate trust on the received
information based on the threshold range and detection range
of the node. If the message is received from a node which
lies beyond the threshold range, message is discarded by
the fact that node lies very far from the EV . If message is
received from the node inside threshold range, then second
check on the detection range is performed on the message.
If EV receives a message from within the detection range,
then it calculate trust on the message. Since, EV has direct
information about the event within the detection range, then
if message received from the transmitting vehicle contradicts
the point of view of EV , then message is assumed to be
compromised and is discarded. However, if received message
is correct, then EV increments the trust of the message sender
with an honesty factor. In the next step, ifEV node lies outside
the detection range of the message, then it collects responses
from its neighbors. If total received responses exceeds the
defined threshold, then information is accepted and trust is
increases, otherwise, message is classified as malicious and
trust is decreased.
4) Neighbor monitoring: EV relies heavily on its neigh-
borhood for information collection in VSRP, therefore, every
vehicle monitors its neighbors continuously. Based on the
shared information from neighbors, EV can decide whether
the node is transmitting correct message or compromised
message.
D. MODULE 4: CONTEXT ESTABLISHMENT
1) CONTEXT IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we present the contexts where efficiency of
the TMs are to be evaluated. In our work, we have identified
two contexts based on the mobility of the vehicles in the
network.
CON1: Vehicles with high mobility
CON2: Vehicles with low mobility
2) IDENTIFICATION OF ATTACKER MODEL
In order to evaluate the efficiency of different TMs in pres-
ence of adversaries, we considered attacker model (AM)
which is altering and delaying legitimate messages with the
factor of ‘‘d’’. The following two AMs were considered in
this work:
AM1: Attackers are static in the network
AM2: Attackers are mobile in the network
3) VANET ATTACK SCENARIO
With the identification of the context and AMs in VANET,
following four combinational scenarios are possible as shown
in Table 4. Scenario 1 represents a network with highly
mobile legitimate vehicles and attackers which are statically
present in the network. In scenario 2, both legitimate vehi-
cles and attackers are mobile. Scenario 3 is composed of
network where vehicles have low mobility and attackers are
static in the network, while in scenario 4, legitimate vehi-
cles have low mobility, but attackers are also mobile in the
network.
TABLE 4. VANET attack scenario.
E. MODULE 5: TRUST EVALUATION PLATFORM
Trust Evaluation Platform (TEP) represents the most signif-
icant module of the trust evaluation framework where TMs
are evaluated according to several proposed criteria. Themes-
sage received at EV is acceptable only when it is verified in
terms of its authenticity and integrity. According to Figure 2,
TEAM framework has three inputs, i.e., (1) list of attacks,
(2) trust models, and (3) identified contexts. TEAM has fol-
lowing four modules for the evaluation of TMs:
1) Message Evaluation Module
2) Trust Computation Module
3) Trust Updation Module
4) Trust Evaluation Module
1) MESSAGE EVALUATION MODULE
This module is responsible for the early identification of false
events in the network by performing initial checks on the
messages. The messages generated about specific event is
verified and evaluated for its authenticity and accuracy. In our
framework, the received message (M ) is composed of two
sub-messages:
M = MO +MT (9)
where MO represents original message containing informa-
tion regarding location and time of event generation, while
MT is the trust message incorporating confidence of sender
about the event. OnceM is received at EV , it is verified in the
following two dimensions:
• Message Validity (MV ): EveryM have respective valid-
ity depending upon the event. For instance, the informa-
tion related to route closure due to construction should
be valid for about 60-120 minutes while temporary road
blockage due to minor accident should be valid for
30-40 minutes in that specific region. This information
regarding the message validity can be verified by time
stamps ofM .
• Message Relevancy (MR): ensures accurate informa-
tion dissemination to the vehicular users. For example,
if EV is located at Kedleston Road in Derby, UK, and
the received messages contains information about road
accident in Birmingham, UK, then this information is
irrelevant for EV .MR can be achieved with GPS coordi-
nates of the message sender.
Based onMV andMR, following four cases arises. Figure 3
shows that EV computes trust on received M only if it pro-
vides both valid and relevant messages. Distrust is computed
by EV in all other cases if M violates these early checks on
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FIGURE 3. Use Cases for Message Verification and Evaluation.
the messages. Once, M is evaluated in terms of its validity
and relevancy, then in the next step, trust onM is computed.
2) TRUST COMPUTATION MODULE
This module is responsible for trust computation on the
received message. Particularly, following two steps are
involved in this module: (1) Identification of initial trust
computations, and (2) Trust up-gradation of vehicle in a given
time span at the EV .
The trust computation module is further categorized into
two submodules: (1) trust computation on vehicle, and
(2) trust computation on data.
a: TRUST COMPUTATION ON THE VEHICLE
Whenever a message is received at EV , trust is either com-
puted on vehicle or its data based on the above two sub-
modules. This module integrates two basic trust computation
methods: 1) Role-based trust (RBT), and 2) Experienced-
based trust (EBT). RBT incorporates trust from those vehi-
cles which are highly trusted in the network. For instance,
law-enforcement vehicles or ambulances etc. In our frame-
work, we have defined four types of vehicles (veh) in the
network. (1) Higher authority (HA) vehicles (such as law-
enforcement, and ambulances) – the messages from such
vehicles are highly trusted as they are authorized by the
central authority. (2) Public transport (PT ) vehicles (such as
buses, and taxis) – highly trusted as they are authenticated
and authorized by specific department, (3) Professional (P)
vehicles – individual drivers with higher travel experience,
(4) Ordinary (O) Cars – cars with no travel history. Since,
to ensure the realistic behavior of the network in terms of
trusted vehicles, we assume thatHA vehicles are most trusted
as the information generated by such vehicles is authenticated
by the central authority. Next, the information shared byPT is
also trusted due to their authorization by a specific depart-
ment. Similarly, for P vehicles, node authorization is done at
the node level. Therefore, we can model RBT according to
equation 10.
TrustRBT =

1 if veh = HA
0.9 if veh = PT
0.8 if veh = P
(10)
As stated earlier, VANET is a large scale, therefore,
we assume that the network will have majority of ordi-
nary vehicles and a minority of role-based vehicles. In our
model, messages received from first three types of vehi-
cles are highly trusted as shown in equation 10. However,
if message is received from ordinary vehicles, then EBT is
computed to check the authenticity and accuracy of the mes-
sage. As explained earlier, EBT incorporates location and
time closeness factor into account to calculate trustworthi-
ness on the received message. If vehicle transmitted correct
message (M ), then EV increase trust level of the message
sender vehicle by an honesty factor. However, trust of the
transmitting vehicle is decreased by a punishment factor if
sharedM is malicious as described by equation 11.
TrustEBT =
{
Honesty ifM = Trusted
Punishment ifM = Untrusted (11)
b: TRUST COMPUTATION ON THE DATA
Whenever, sender vehicle transmits a message, it also inte-
grates its confidence level (CL) on the message. CL plays a
significant role in trust computation, where it ensures that
the sender vehicle is confident enough on the authenticity
and accuracy of the transmitted message. CL depends on
two aspects: (1) high CL values are desirable if vehicle has
direct link to the event, (2) CL varies from high to low for
indirect interaction of vehicle with the event. Thus, trust
computation on the message depends on the link between
the sender and the EV . For direct message, trust is calculated
based on the quality of message which depends on CL and
the information quality (infoQ). Vehicles residing close to
event have high CL and (infoQ), thus messages received
from such vehicles are trusted. On the other hand, trust
from vehicles decreases with its increasing distance from
the event. In case of trust evaluation for indirect messages,
a broadcast/drop ratio is employed according to equation 3.
High trust is assigned to vehicles if this ratio is high and
vice versa.
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FIGURE 4. Simulated Maps of Derby (a) Urban (b) Rural.
3) TRUST EVALUATION MODULE
Once, trust on the node and data is computed, next step is
to evaluate the trust via trust evaluation module. In order to
do so, we proposed and implemented sixteen distinct evalu-
ation criteria in our framework based on network topology,
data generation and time duration [42]. For demonstration
of our framework, we evaluated TMs against eight criteria
depending upon network topology (legitimate & malicious
vehicles), QoS of network, security and amount of trusted
information in the network. These are (1) event certainty,
(2) robustness against attacks, (3) managing end-to-end
delays, (4) promoting node trustworthiness, (5) operating in
presence of malicious vehicles, (6) benchmarking against
other TMs, (7) detecting false positives and false negatives,
and (8) operating in various contexts.
IV. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
A. SIMULATION SETUP
The core objective of our simulation is to study the
performance of TMs in presence of malicious vehicles
in the network. To facilitate our simulations, we used
Veins [43], [44], an open source framework used widely
for the simulations of vehicular networks. Veins is built on
top of two popular simulators: SUMO (traffic simulator)
[45], [46] and OMNET++ (discrete event simulator) [47].
SUMO provides mobility and traffic patterns for a map which
can be imported from OpenStreetMap while OMNET++
provides variousmodules (application layer, DSRC and phys-
ical layer) to ensure realistic network behavior. A small patch
‘‘Traffic Control Interface (TraCI)’’ is used for communi-
cation between OMNET++ and SUMO [48]. Whenever,
an event (accident information) is triggered in OMNET++,
TraCI enables the vehicles in SUMO to change their route by
sending out respective commands.
In order to identify the behavior and performance of TMs,
we imported two maps from the city of Derby, United King-
dom using OpenStreetMap [49], [50]. One map represents
a city center scenario while other shows the rural area of
Derby as depicted in Figure 4. The vehicles in the city center
have low mobility while rural area contain vehicles with high
mobility. Moreover, all vehicles are equipped with standard
wireless communication interface, i.e., IEEE 802.11p proto-
col. In order to facilitate attackers in the network, we consid-
ered mobile attackers in scenario 2 & 4. These attackers have
the ability to launch attacks while on the move, thus creating
impact on different regions of the network. For scenario 1&3,
static attackers are randomly placed throughout the
network.
According to [51], majority of the vehicles in the network
are legitimate and performs their task honestly. Therefore,
to study the behavior of the TMs in presence of malicious
vehicles, we kept the number of legitimate vehicles constant
and increases the presence of adversaries in the network
from 10% to 50%.
Table 5 provide the details of various parameters used for
the evaluation of TMs. We used a condition that (β = 10×α)
based on logic that trust cannot be established easily, i.e, trust
is very rare and easy to break. In our simulations, we also
kept the initial trust value to 0.5 to avoid the cold start
problem [52], [53].
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
An adversary is a node which have the ability to launch an
attack to gain unauthorized entry into the system for their
own interest [37]. In order to evaluate performance of TMs
in presence of attackers, we considered man-in-the-middle
attacks (MITM) as an adversary model for TEAM frame-
work which is identified via threat model (module 1) and
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TABLE 5. Simulation details.
risk assessment (module 2) of the framework. According to
risk assessment, MITM poses critical risk in VANET, there-
fore, we considered MITM attack with the ability to alter
and delay sensitive (i.e., accident) information by a factor
of ‘‘d’’ seconds. Since, very sensitive information (such as
collision avoidance) is shared among vehicles in VANET,
therefore, tempering such data can have severe impact on
the network. Further, delaying such sensitive data prohibits
the legitimate vehicles to receive information on-time. The
designed adversary model is equipped with both of these
capabilities. In order to demonstrate TEAM framework, three
trust models are evaluated in presence of such MITM attack-
ers. The high-level pseudo code of considered adversary
model is depicted in algorithm 1. It can be seen that whenever
message arrives at the MITM attacker, the attacker first cre-
ates an attackedmessageMA, where the content is first altered
using specific alteration function. In the next phase, delay is
calculated at the attacker node which is then appended to the
altered message. At this stage, the attacker broadcast the mes-
sage which is then received by the legitimate vehicles in its
vicinity.
Algorithm 1 Adversary Model
Input: Legitimate MessageMG
Output: Attacked MessageMA
1: if (received message == MG) then
2: Check ‘content’ ofMG
3: if (content == ‘‘data’’) then
4: Create Attacked Message ‘‘MA’’
5: Message_alteration(MA)
6: Message_delay(MA)
7: end if
8: TransmitMA at time (tsend + d)
9: end if
C. EVALUATION METRICS
We defined following metrics to evaluate the efficiency
of TMs using TEAM in terms of security and Quality of
Service (QoS).
1) END-TO-END DELAY (E2ED)
This metric relates to QoS of TM; depicting the total delay
caused to packets generated by legitimate vehicle to be shared
with neighboring vehicles. As our attacker model is con-
stantly delaying messages, therefore, E2ED is an important
metric to understand the behavior of TM when packets are
delayed by such malicious vehicles. Ideally, TM with low
E2ED is desirable in the network. E2ED is the difference of
packet generation time (TG) and packet reception time (TR)
which is calculated as follows:
E2ED = TR − TG (12)
2) EVENT DETECTION PROBABILITY (EDP)
We defined this metric to identify true events in the network.
As the attackmodel in our simulator can change true informa-
tion with garbage information, therefore, this metric (EDP)
will correctly identify true and bogus events in the network.
Let ETot represents total events generated in the network, out
of which ET and EM are true and malicious events respec-
tively, then probability to detect true event (EDP) can be
mathematically given by:
EDP =
∑
(ETot − EM )
ETot
(13)
The TM is considered to be effective and efficient, if it has
high event detection rate.
3) ANOMALY RATIO (AR)
AR is defined to identify malicious activity in the network.
The transmitting vehicle performs two types of activities in
the network, i.e., either legitimate or malicious. Based on this
metric, EV can identify the behavior of transmitting node.
Upon detection of malicious activity by EV , this information
is shared with the neighboring vehicles. Higher the AR ratio,
higher the node have ability to detect malicious node in the
network [54]. AR is defined as the ratio of malicious packets
to the total generated messages. Let sender ‘S’ generates total
MT (S) messages, MM (S) represents those packets which are
tempered and compromised by the sender, then, AR (η(S))
can be represented as follows.
η(S) = MM (S)
MT (S)
(14)
4) FALSE POSITIVE RATE (FPR)
FPR represents the effectiveness of TM to identify compro-
mised messages which are incorrectly labeled and identified
as legitimate vehicles. Ideally, the TMs should have low
FPR values. Let PM |L represents the probability of detecting
node as malicious, given the node is legitimate, and PL|L is
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FIGURE 5. End-to-End Delay (a) Data-Oriented TM (b) Entity-Oriented TM (c) Hybrid TM.
the probability of detecting node as legitimate, given the node
is legitimate, then FPR is mathematically written as:
False Positive Rate = PM |L
PL|L + PM |L (15)
5) TRUSTED & UNTRUSTED PACKETS
These metrics are defined to identify the amount of trusted
and untrusted packets in the network. Let NTotal is the total
packets generated in the network. Out of NTotal packets,
NTrusted are the trusted packets andNUntrusted are the untrusted
packets. Then we calculate trusted and untrusted packets as
follows:
NTrusted =
∑
(NTotal − NUntrusted ) (16)
NUntrusted =
∑
(NTotal − NTrusted ) (17)
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we first present the simulation results of
different TMs using our proposed TEAM framework. Then,
we focused on the discussion of the performance of TEAM
framework.
A. EVALUATION OF TRUST MODELS
We evaluated the performance of three TMs (data-oriented
trust model, entity-oriented trust model, hybrid trust model)
using various evaluation criteria which mainly focused on
the security and QoS of the network as mentioned in
section IV-C. Figures 5 to 10 depict that the presence of mali-
cious vehicles deteriorate the performance of TMs in terms of
high end-to-end delays, false positive rates and high number
of untrusted packets in the network. Moreover, the existence
of adversaries also reduces the probability to detect true
events, anomalies and generation of trusted packets in the
network.
1) END-TO-END DELAY
Figure 5a shows E2ED of data-oriented trust model in four
scenarios. It can be seen that scenario 4 outperforms other
scenarios by achieving lowest end-to-end delay (E2ED).
Moreover, static attackers affect the network more rather than
mobile attackers. As the impact created by static attackers is
limited to a specific geographical location, therefore, increas-
ing such malicious vehicles results in delaying more pack-
ets in the network, ultimately increasing the overall E2ED.
On the other hand, the scope of attack by mobile attacker is
not limited to specific location due to their constant mobility.
It is quite possible that legitimate vehicles might receive mes-
sages from neighborhood in that specific location. Comparing
all scenarios for DOTM, for a network with 50% malicious
vehicles, we observed that scenario 1, 2 & 3 attains 61.33%,
96.47% & 98.92% high E2EDs respectively as compared to
scenario 4.
Figure 5b highlights E2ED for entity-oriented trust model,
where network with low mobility is affected significantly by
static malicious entries. These malicious vehicles introduce
massive delay in the attack-prone area which prohibits the
legitimate vehicles to receive messages on time. Increasing
static attackers in the network increases the attack vector
which results in higher message delay. On the other hand,
mobile attackers have high influence on the network with
high mobility. Attack vector of such attackers continuously
change due to their mobility, thus the impact caused by
mobile malicious vehicles is different from static malicious
vehicles. From Figure 5b, we observe that when a net-
work contains 50% malicious vehicles, scenario 1 performs
19.31%, 64.16% and 3.3% better than scenario 2, 3 and 4
respectively by achieving low E2E delays.
Figure 5c represents the E2E delay of the network utiliz-
ing hybrid trust model. The performance of HTM is simi-
lar to DOTM, where, network achieves highest end-to-end
delays in scenario 3 and lowest in scenario 4. HTM inte-
grates both sender reputation and data correctness, thus the
evaluator node requires more time to calculate and evaluate
trust as these are time intensive processes. From Figure 5c,
scenario 4 performs 31.6%, 60.9% and 86.7% better than
scenario 2, 1 and 3 respectively by achieving lower E2ED.
Figure 5 presents the simulation results of three trust mod-
els in terms of end-to-end delay. It can be seen that the
network achieves low E2ED in presence of EOTM, rather
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FIGURE 6. Event Detection Probability (a) Data-Oriented TM (b) Entity-Oriented TM (c) Hybrid TM.
than DOTM and HTM. This is due to the existence of role-
based and highly experienced vehicles which can detect and
eliminate dishonest vehicles from the network. On the other
hand, DOTM and HTM depends on data for trust evaluation,
which is continuously delayed by the malicious vehicles.
As a result, legitimate vehicles are unable to receive messages
in-time, thus creating a strong impact on the network in terms
of high E2E delay.
2) EVENT DETECTION PROBABILITY
Figure 6a depicts the probability of data-oriented trust model
to detect true events in four scenarios. It can be seen that
highest EDP is achieved when the network contains mobile
attackers. The attack vector of the mobile attacker constantly
changes. As a result, probability of vehicles to detect true
event increases as they might receive true events from other
honest vehicles in its vicinity. On the other hand, static
attackers decreases the ability of legitimate vehicles to detect
true events due to constant attack-vector in geographical
location. For a network with 20%malicious nodes, scenario 2
achieves 5.3%, 44.3% & 33.5% high EDP than
scenario 1, 3 & 4 respectively.
Event detection probability of entity-oriented TM is shown
in Figure 6b, highlighting that high mobility networks are
affected to a greater extent with mobile attackers, where the
detection of true events decreases massively in the network.
Static attackers, on the other hand, create high impact on
the network with low mobility (such as city center), where
increasing such vehicles increases the generation of com-
promised messages in the network. This limits the scope of
the legitimate vehicles to correctly detect true events in the
network. Among all the considered scenarios, highest EDP
is achieved in scenario 1 and lowest EDP in scenario 3.
When the network is injected with 20% malicious nodes,
scenario 1 achieves 8.9%, 19.2% & 32.9% better EDP than
scenario 4, 2 & 3 respectively.
Figure 6c shows the true event detection probability of
hybrid trust model in four scenarios. HTM performs simi-
lar to DOTM where highest EDP is achieved in scenario 2
and lowest in scenario 3. The vehicles incorporating
HTM integrates trust evaluation on the received data, which
may be tempered by malicious vehicles. Increasing such
vehicles which disseminates compromised data will limit the
vehicles to correctly identify true events, thus decreasing
network efficiency. For a network having 20% malicious
vehicles, scenario 2 achieves 7.5%, 44.1%&35.2%high EDP
than scenario 1, 3 & 4 respectively.
Figure 6 depicts that the event detection probability of
entity-oriented trust model is better than other trust models.
EOTM integrates role-based trust mechanism which ensures
the propagation of true events in the network. As a result,
the scope of vehicles to detect true events increases in the
network in presence of malicious vehicles.
3) ANOMALY RATIO
Figure 7a depicts the capability of data-oriented trust model
to detect anomalies in the network. It shows that scenario 4
outperforms other scenarios by detecting maximum number
of anomalies. This is due to the fact that mobile attackers
affect the high number of vehicles as a consequence of
their low mobility. On the other hand, less anomalies are
detected in scenario 1, as the vehicles communicate for a
very short span of time for highly mobile legitimate vehicles
and static attackers. For 50% malicious vehicles, scenario 4
can detect 31.1%, 77.5% & 86.13% better anomalies than
scenario 2, 3 & 1 respectively.
Figure 7b shows the anomaly ratio of the network incor-
porating entity-oriented trust model, highlighting that sce-
nario 4 can detect high number of anomalies in the network
as in DOTM. The lowmobility and high number of legitimate
vehicles (e.g., city center) can detect malicious activity in the
network.When the network contains 50%malicious vehicles,
scenario 4 detects 81.1%, 2.16% and 84.88%more anomalies
than scenario 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
The ability of hybrid trust model to detect anomalies is
shown in figure 7c. HTM behaves similar to DOTM where
low mobility of legitimate vehicles detects high number of
anomalies in the network in the presence of mobile mali-
cious attackers. These attackers provide an opportunity of
window to the vehicles to communicate and detect anomalies
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FIGURE 7. Anomaly Ratio (a) Data-Oriented TM (b) Entity-Oriented TM (c) Hybrid TM.
FIGURE 8. False Positive Rate (a) Data-Oriented TM (b) Entity-Oriented TM (c) Hybrid TM.
in the network. For a network injected with 50 % malicious
vehicles, scenario 4 provides 83.9%, 20% and 79.6% better
results than scenario 1, 2 and 3 respectively by detectingmore
anomalies.
In short, figure 7 clearly depicts that entity-oriented trust
model can detect high number of anomalies than data-
oriented and hybrid trust model. EOTM relies on trusted and
experienced vehicles which are classified as trusted members
of the network by the higher authorities, thus, the ability of the
vehicles to detect malicious activity in the network increases.
4) FALSE POSITIVE RATE
False positive rate illustrate the error margin of the TMwhere
malicious entity and its content is incorrectly identified as
legitimate. FPR of the data-oriented and hybrid trust mod-
els is shown in Figures 8a & 8c, emphasizing that network
attains high FPR in scenario 1 & 4 where it increases almost
exponentially as compared to scenario 2 & 3. Moreover,
DOTM & HTM achieves high FPR for a network containing
high mobility and static attackers. These attackers provide
limited window of opportunity for legitimate vehicles to com-
municate with each other. Increasing such malicious vehi-
cles in the network increases the probability of incorrectly
labeling valid data as malicious. DOTM and HTM achieves
low FPR in urban scenario where high density of legitimate
vehicles can correctly identify valid messages. For a network
incorporatingDOTMand containing 30%malicious vehicles,
scenario 3 achieves 50.3%, 18.23% and 25.78% low FPR
than scenario 1, 2 and 4 respectively. In case of HTM,
scenario 3 achieves 45.7%, 37.6% and 41.5% low FPR than
scenario 1, 2 and 4 respectively.
FPR for entity-oriented trust model is highlighted in
Figure 8b, demonstrating that efficiency of the network
decreases in terms of FPR when it is flooded with mobile
attackers. The attack-vector of such attacker changes continu-
ously which increase the probability of incorrectly classifying
malicious message as valid. Among 4 scenarios, EOTM per-
forms better in scenario 3, where low FPR is achieved. The
low mobility and high density of vehicles produce a massive
amount of messages, which provide an extended window to
legitimate vehicles to identify true and malicious events in
the network. When a network is flooded with 30% malicious
nodes, scenario 3 performs 11.4%, 29.6% and 45.4% better
than scenario 1, 2 and 4 respectively by achieving low FPR.
The main reason for achieving low FPR in EOTM and HTM
is the integration of role-based and direct trust evaluation
mechanism respectively, thus reducing the probability to
incorrectly detect malicious nodes.
5) TRUSTED AND UNTRUSTED PACKETS
Figures 9 & 10 show the number of trusted and untrusted
packets generated by a network incorporating DOTM, EOTM
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FIGURE 9. Trusted packets in the network (a) Data-Oriented TM (b) Entity-Oriented TM (c) Hybrid TM.
FIGURE 10. Untrusted packets in the network (a) Data-Oriented TM (b) Entity-Oriented TM (c) Hybrid TM.
and HTM respectively, demonstrating that scenario 4 out-
performs other scenarios by propagating high number of
trusted messages in VANET. This is due to the fact that
low mobility of vehicles provide ample amount of time for
legitimate vehicles to validate trust on the sender. Moreover,
network is affected when it is polluted with static attackers.
These attackers have a constant attack-vector in a attack-
prone location, thus it is highly unlikely that vehicles receive
trusted messages from legitimate vehicles in presence of
these attackers. On the contrary, vehicles have the possibility
to receive trusted messages in presence of mobile attack-
ers as the attack-vector changes continuously due to their
mobility.
When a network integrates DOTMand is floodedwith 50%
malicious vehicles, scenario 4 generates 86.12%, 31.12%
and 82% more trusted packets and 67.66%, 24.45% and
64.46% less untrusted packets generated for scenario 1, 2
and 3 respectively. In case of the network with EOTM,
scenario 4 generates 84.5%, 0.25% and 80.8% more trusted
and 47%, 0.26%, 45.87% less untrusted packets than
scenario 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Moreover, for a net-
work incorporating HTM, scenario 4 produces 83.9%,
20.1% and 79.6% more trusted and 33.9%, 10.94%,
32.68% less untrusted packets than scenario 1, 2, and 3
respectively.
B. DISCUSSION
In this section, we focus on the discussion of TEAM frame-
work performance in terms of its applicability, usability,
scalability, security assurance and limitation.
1) APPLICABILITY OF TEAM
TEAM provides a base framework for smart city planners
and automobile manufacturers to design, test and validate
TMs in different contexts and attacker models before inte-
grating them within the vehicles and network. Moreover,
TEAM provides various TMs for benchmarking purposes.
Further, TEAM can be used by the researchers to validate
their newly designed TM. Thus, a wide range of users (auto-
mobile manufacturers, researchers and smart city planners)
can evaluate the efficiency of the designed TM by comparing
it against benchmarked TM using an extensive set of realistic
trust evaluation criteria.
2) USABILITY OF TEAM
TEAM is designed using three widely used open-source plat-
forms, i.e., OMNET++, VEINS and SUMO. OMNET++
supports the graphical user interface, therefore, TEAM can
provide the graphical representation of the network where
the user can visualize the behavior of the TM. Thus,
the smart city planners or users with knowledge about these
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standardized platforms can validate newly designed and
available TMs using TEAM. However, a small effort is
required to understand the implementation and integration of
various components of TM within the framework. TEAM is
available to researchers upon request for research purposes.
3) SCALABILITY ANALYSIS
Scalability is one of the crucial requirement in VANET as
the rate of entering and exiting vehicles in the network is not
constant. Thus, the TMs should be scalable and independent
of network size and vehicles mobility. TEAM is a scalable
framework as it integrates scalable simulation tools such as
OMNET++ [55], SUMO [56] and VEINS [57].
We tested our framework by evaluating TMs in four con-
texts with random vehicular mobility. However, more con-
texts can easily be integrated in TEAM. For example, contexts
based on vehicles concentration and dispersion across the
network is not considered in current framework.
Moreover, in the context of smart city, TEAM can support
high number of vehicles to better understand the behavior of
TMs for validation purposes. TEAM framework integrates
realistic maps, imported directly from OpenStreetMap. Traf-
fic is generated on these maps via SUMO which includes
both mobile and static vehicles (attackers) in the network.
However, identifying the ideal location on themap for placing
static vehicles is a time intensive process as the user has to
first identify the favorable place on the map and then align
the vehicle in that location to utilize its capabilities. This com-
plexity increases when the user has to place a high number of
static vehicles in the network. For instance, placing 80% static
attackers for a network with 1000 vehicles is challenging as
the user has to identify ideal locations for implementing such
high number of attackers on the map.
4) SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is eminently important for TMs to be robust against attacks
which reduces the network performance by transmitting
untrusted and compromised messages in the network such as
MITM attacks. Threat model and risk assessment modules of
TEAM identified various attacker models (AMs) with critical
and high risk in the network. Our framework has the ability to
provide the security perspective for the evaluation of TMs in
the network as AMs with critical risks are integrated within
TEAM. We tested the behavior of three TMs using TEAM in
presence of MITM attackers. Simulation results indicate that
the implemented EOTM is more resilient to MITM attacks
than DOTM and HTM. This is due to the fact that EOTM
integrates role-based and experience-based trust management
schemes which ensures the propagation of trusted messages
in the network. On the other hand, DOTM and HTM relies
heavily on trustworthiness of data for trust calculation, which
can be compromised by the attackers. Further, the absence of
role-based vehicles in the network degrades the performance
of DOTM and HTM in presence of MITM attacks as no
trusted vehicle is present to evaluate the trustworthiness of
the message. Therefore, DOTM and HTM has to rely on
ordinary vehicles for trust calculation. In general, any trust
model which integrates role-based trust management scheme
can perform well in presence of malicious vehicles as this can
ensure the presence of trusted information in the network.
5) LIMITATION OF TEAM
Simulation results showed the applicability of TEAM to accu-
rately evaluate the TMs inVANET. However, there are certain
limitations in current framework.
• Modeling human factor (driver’s honesty and selfish-
ness) accurately for trust management is a challenging
task inVANET. Recently, someTMs are proposedwhich
relies on social networks for trust management such
as [58] and [59]. Currently, TEAM can only evaluate
TMs for pure VANET and it cannot evaluate social-
network based TMs as it is not integrated in our frame-
work yet.
• Recently, some effort is done in adopting Content-
Centric Networking (CCN) and Named Data Network-
ing (NDN) into VANET [60], [61]. Currently, TEAM
is limited to host-based communication paradigm only,
and hence, it can not evaluate TMs which are developed
purely on CCN and NDN-based VANET.
• We have tested the performance of our framework with
up-to 300 vehicles which were generated in SUMO.
Theoretically, TEAM is scalable and can support higher
number of vehicles. Only complexity is placing higher
number of static nodes at the micro-level on the realistic
map.
VI. CONCLUSION
A secure and attack-free environment is a prerequisite in
VANET for trusted message dissemination among vehi-
cles and infrastructure. However, as various contexts are
involved in VANET, ensuring trusted environment in every
context is an extremely challenging task as the attackers
penetrate the network and pollute it with bogus information.
Therefore, the TMs should be validated in different context
of VANET, and there should be a way to compare different
proposed TMs.
In this paper, we presented a novel framework which can
validate and evaluate the efficiency of TMs in VANET. Var-
ious attacker models are identified using threat model and
risk assessment which are integrated in our framework. These
attacker models can be used to evaluate TMs in presence of
the malicious nodes.
In order to demonstrate our framework, we implemented
three different TMs, i.e., entity-oriented, data-oriented and
hybrid trust model. We conducted an extensive set of simula-
tions to study the behavior of TMs under different contexts
and attacker models. TEAM revealed an interesting result
which changes the general perception that hybrid trust models
perform better in VANET due to their imperative nature of
evaluating trust on both vehicle and data. However, according
to our framework, entity-oriented TM outperforms both data-
oriented and hybrid TMs. This is due to the presence of highly
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trusted and experienced vehicles in the network ensuring the
dissemination of trusted messages.
As future work, we intend to extend this research by
implementing and evaluating more TMs with TEAM against
further attacker models and contexts.
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